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WHEN TIME ISN'T MONEY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF EARLY VOTING 
AND CAMPAIGN SPENDING
Philip J. Zakahi 
In an October 1, 2008, Washington Post piece titled, “Nov. 4 Isn’t the Only Election Day; Campaigns Adjust as Early Vot-ing Rises,” Mary Pat Flaherty outlines the tactics major party 
presidential campaigns use to win over “electoral gold”—the “early 
voters” who take advantage of laws in thirty-six states allowing them 
to vote before Election Day. In some states, a majority of voters 
now cast their ballots before Election Day, and media reports like 
Flaherty’s suggest campaigns have adjusted to the increasingly large 
number of early voters. They use specially targeted ads and get-out-
the-vote operations to reach voters who might vote early. Scholars, 
however, have yet to adjust their work to incorporate these changes 
in campaign practices. While there is a large body of literature ex-
ploring the changes in turnout and electoral demographics due to 
early voting, there is almost no research examining the role of early 
voting in campaign behavior. This appears particularly important 
for scholars examining the role of campaign expenditures on elec-
toral outcomes. Existing work simply does not account for a world 
in which a large number of voters have cast their ballots before 
campaigns have spent 100 percent of their funds. This study begins 
to fill that gap by demonstrating that candidates do spend money 
earlier in states with early voting and offering evidence to suggest 
this early spending may not necessarily give candidates an electoral 
advantage. The first finding helps to validate the claims made by 
campaign experts and news media about the impact of early vot-
ing on campaigns. The second finding can guide the spending of 
campaigns in states where there is early voting and candidates may 
be tempted to spend their funds early. Together, they challenge the 
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academic literature to account for the growing role of early voters. 
AN UNEXPLORED TOPIC
This study stands at an intersection between two relatively 
large fields of research within the study of American electoral 
politics. The first field is the study of early, absentee, and mail-in 
voting. Authors in this field broadly ask the question, “What im-
pact does early voting have?” They tend to focus on the questions: 
“Who votes early?” and “Does early voting increase turnout?” These 
questions may consider the influences of campaigns on early vot-
ing, but they do not tend to consider how early voting influences 
campaigns. They focus on the voter as the major unit of analysis, 
rather than the candidate and campaign. The second field is the 
study of candidate campaign expenditures. Authors in this field 
focus on the question: “Do campaign expenditures matter?” They 
too look at the practical question of whether incumbent spending 
matters, focusing on individual candidate campaigns as the major 
unit of analysis; however, they grapple with the significant meth-
odological challenge posed by an incumbent’s ability to match the 
spending of a strong challenger. This phenomenon makes standard 
least squares regression nearly useless for comparing spending and 
election outcomes. Moreover, authors fail to give any credence to 
the large portion of voters who vote before Election Day. The fol-
lowing is an examination of the weaknesses in the current literature 
and a description of how this study seeks to address them. 
Early Voting Literature
Most of the work conducted on early voting that examines 
whether the widespread availability of early voting increases turn-
out, as exemplified by Oliver and Stein and Garcia-Money’s major 
studies, suggests that early voting does indeed raise overall voting 
numbers.1 The other large subsection of research on early voting 
focuses on the demographics of early voters, such as Stein’s research 
comparing the demographics of early voters to Election Day voters 
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in Texas.2 While these studies consider the role of campaigns in 
mobilizing people to vote early, they fail to consider the reverse of 
the relationship: how early voting influences the campaigns. Gron-
ke does suggest a course of research that includes the impact of ear-
ly voting on campaigns, but he focuses on voters and ballot return 
instead of directly exploring the impact on campaigns.3 A study 
by Andrew Busch, the one exception to this framework, looks at a 
variety of data from surveys of campaigns and county clerks along 
with a narrow span of finance data from Colorado, but lacks meth-
odological rigor.4
Campaign Expenditure Literature
There are two major categories of work dealing with cam-
paign expenditures. There are theoretical “economic” models, as 
referred to by Jacobsen, and “empirical” studies, as defined by Strat-
tman.*5 Economic models of campaign expenditures like Welch, 
Prat, and Milyo’s studies theorize about the relationships between 
donors, candidates, and voters and seek to understand the impact 
that spending has on each.6 Overall, these economic models tend 
to lack interaction with the variance of actual campaigns, where 
motives and behaviors vary from person to person and campaign 
to campaign. 
Almost all of the current empirical literature on campaign ex-
penditures traces back to a study by Gary C. Jacobsen that makes 
two key points that have launched the two central debates in the 
field.7 The first is whether incumbent expenditures have signifi-
cantly less impact on election outcomes than challenger expendi-
tures. The second is whether traditional Ordinary Least Squares 
regression models accurately measure the relationship between ex-
penditures and election outcomes.
 Authors answer the first question in three ways. Green and 
Krasno argue that incumbent spending does have a significant 
*  This study focuses on campaign expenditures, ignoring other topics of money and politics. For 
a thorough review of the literature, see Thomas Stratmann, "Some Talk: Money in Politics. A 
(Partial) Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Perspectives on the Post-9/11 World ( July, 
2005), http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026707.
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positive impact on vote share and election outcomes.8 Coates, who 
agrees with Jacobsen,9 argues that incumbent spending has no 
positive impact on election outcomes and may even have a negative 
impact. Finally, Levitt finds that both challenger and incumbent 
spending have only a small influence on election outcomes.10 This 
study builds on this research and hopes to present another case in 
this ongoing debate by isolating votes cast before Election Day and 
the spending that could have influenced those votes.
 The other major distinction in the field is methodological. 
Studies vary in how they attempt to compensate for the effects of 
an incumbent’s ability to spend money when faced with a strong 
challenger. Many studies, like Jacobsen’s, Green and Krasno’s, and 
Coates’s focus on statistical means to control for these issues.11 
These studies tend to make little headway and, as Gerber points 
out, the “approaches vary widely.”12 Levitt, Gerber, and Green and 
Panagopoulos have tried structuring the study itself to isolate the 
expenditure variable.13 Their attempts, however, look only at a spe-
cific scenario or reference an anecdotal number of cases. Kenny and 
McBurnett offer another approach that uses a lagged measure of 
campaign income to control for the impact of time, but their study 
lacks any sense of actual campaign expenditure patterns.14 They 
assume expenditures occur when campaigns receive donations, 
without regard for other factors. This study offers an alternative ap-
proach for dealing with the incumbent’s ability to raise and spend 
in reaction to a strong challenger effort, using the existence of early 
voting to isolate the impact of campaign spending on vote share. 
This extra variable allows us to return to the simple model offered 
by Jacobsen, instead of relying on the more complex and less realis-
tic statistical manipulation of other studies.       
TWO QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHETICALLY STRAIGHT 
FORWARD ANSWERS 
This study focuses on campaign expenditures as they 
relate to early voting, asking whether early voting influences 
campaigns to spend their funds earlier and whether spend-
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ing campaign funds before early voting begins positively 
impacts election outcomes. This allows us to control for chal-
lenger strength and an incumbent’s tendency to spend more 
money when vulnerable by using the proportion of funds 
spent as opposed to the total amount. Thus, we can control 
for variables previously unaccounted for in expenditure stud-
ies without significantly limiting the number of cases to ex-
amine. This leaves two interesting avenues to explore. First, 
are candidates in states that allow the general population to 
vote early more likely to spend money earlier than candidates 
where there is not a significant portion of the population vot-
ing early? Secondly, are candidates who spend money early 
in states where early voting occurs more likely to win a large 
portion of the vote than candidates who do not?
There are two relatively straightforward hypotheses. 
First, in comparing U.S. House campaigns, candidates in 
states where a large portion of the population votes be-
fore Election Day will spend their funds earlier than those in 
states without a large proportion of early voters. Second, in 
comparing U.S. House campaigns in states with early voting, 
candidates who spend their funds earlier will win more votes 
than those who spend their funds later.
A New Dataset, a New Model, and an Old Model
The first half of this study focuses on the operating expen-
ditures of the 2008 major party candidates from contested House 
races where there was one candidate from the Democratic Party 
and one candidate from the Republican Party—224 races in all.* 
Although only using House races limits the study’s broader appli-
cability, House races are selected to ensure a large sample size and 
because candidates are required to report each of their expenditures 
to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Thanks to significant 
increases in data compiled by Congressional Quarterly from 2008, 
*  In Minnesota the Democratic Farmer Labor Party will be used. Louisiana will be 
excluded because of their “Jungle Primary” system. 
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the information from FEC electronic filings, which is necessary 
to build models based on a campaign’s daily expenditure levels, is 
readily available online. Let us consider the following OLS model:
SD ~ β0 + β1E + β3I + β4SP + β5P     (1)
where the model is calculated three times with the dependent vari-
able, ‘SD’, equal to the number of days from Election Day at which 
a candidate has spent 50, 75, and 90 percent of his or her total 
expenditures as taken from candidate expenditure reports to the 
FEC. The predictor variable ‘E’ is coded as one in states with gen-
eral population early voting and zero in states without general pop-
ulation early voting. The first date of early voting is considered the 
day after no-excuse, absentee, or mail-in voting ballots are available 
or the first date of general population early voting. For the purposes 
of this study, excuse-required absentee voting is not considered ear-
ly voting. Three basic control variables are included in the model. ‘I’ 
assesses incumbency and is coded as zero for challengers and one 
for incumbents. Relative overall spending as reported to the FEC 
is labeled ‘SP.’ It is calculated as the candidate’s total spending di-
vided by the opponent’s total spending and used to control for the 
relative amount of funds available and the relative strength of the 
candidates. Finally, ‘P’ represents the candidate’s party and is coded 
as zero for Republicans and one for Democrats.     
 The second half of the study focuses on challenger vote mar-
gins and uses 2008 contested House races where there was one 
candidate from the Democratic Party and one candidate from the 
Republican Party. Borrowing from Jacobsen’s 1978 study, it looks 
only at the challengers in these races. The study adapts Jacobsen’s 
OLS model, adding a series of terms to account for early voting and 
early spending. This creates two curvilinear OLS models; the first 
model accounts for the timing of early voting and the second the 
percentage of the electorate voting early. 
CV ~ β0 + β1CE + β2IE + β3P + β4PS + β5SD + β6ED + 
β7(SD*ED)     (2)  
CV ~ β0 + β1CE + β2IE + β3P + β4PS + β5SD + β6EV + 
β8(SD*EV)     (3)  
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The dependent variable ‘CV’ is equal to challenger vote share as 
reported by state election officials.* The major predictor variable 
‘SD’ is equal to the difference between the number of days from 
Election Day at which a challenger has spent 50, 75, and 90 percent 
of their total expenditures and the number of days from Election 
Day at which the incumbent has spent the same amount. The pre-
dictors ‘ED’ and ‘EV’ are equal to the first possible date to vote early 
in a given state and the proportion of the population voting early, 
respectively. The interaction terms are combinations of ‘SD’, ‘ED,’ 
and ‘EV’. The control variables ‘CE’, ‘IE’, ‘P’, and ‘PS’ are taken from 
Jacobsen’s 1978 model and refer to challenger expenditures, incum-
bent expenditures, challenger party, and party strength. The first 
two are taken from the FEC, while party is taken from state elec-
tion officials and coded as zero for Republican and one for Demo-
crat. Party strength will be equal to the 2004 presidential vote share 
in the district as reported by Congressional Quarterly.†
*  Milyo argues this measure should be dropped in favor of a binary variable indicating 
whether the race was won or lost. This study, however, looks at the proportion of early 
spending to total spending as opposed to the difference between challenger and incumbent 
spending. This makes winning irrelevant to the study.
†  Jacobsen used previous congressional results to calculate party strength.
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Data Collection
While most of the data was collected directly from the sources 
listed, data for the ‘SD’ variable had to be compiled by first down-
loading the individual expenditure reports from every candidate 
under consideration, made available through Congressional Quar-
terly’s “Money Line.”15 These are newly available in manageable 
electronic format and include a record for each expenditure made 
by a candidate and reported to the FEC. These records include a 
date that was used to find the spending for each day, which was di-
vided by the total spending to find the percentage of total spending 
conducted on any given day. By adding together these days in order, 
the aggregated percentage of spending conducted by a given day 
was determined. The date at which point 50, 75 , and 90 percent 
of expenditures were made was then subtracted from Election Day.
RESULTS
Early Voting has Clear Impact on Campaign Expenditure 
Timing
This section analyzes the output of the models that ex-
plore how early voting impacts the timing of campaign ex-
penditures. Candidates running in states with early voting 
spend their funds significantly earlier than candidates run-
ning in states without early voting. This holds true through-
out the campaign at all three points tested. The volume or 
timing of this early voting does not significantly change the 
timing of spending. The mere possibility of people voting 
early is what is driving campaigns to spend their funds in ad-
vance.
Model (1) was run three times, where the dependent 
variable ‘SD’ (spending days) is equal to the number of days 
from the election at which an observed candidate spent 50, 
75, or 90 percent of his or her total operating expenditures 
for the campaign. These results indicate that in states where 
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general population early voting occurs there is a tendency 
for campaigns to spend their funds earlier. Furthermore, 
while the significance of other variables fluctuates as we shift 
the dependent variable from 50 to 75 to 90 percent of total 
spending, only the presence of early voting has a significant 
impact at all three points. Despite this strong relationship, 
however, neither of the other two measures of early voting—
timing ‘ED’ and percentage of people voting early ‘EV’—has 
a significant impact on the model. Additionally, early voting 
has limited predictive power for determining the timing of 
expenditures. Though significant, early voting predicts only 
about 10 percent of variability in the dependent variable. 
Some other factor or simply the random influence of the 
sheer number of people involved accounts for the rest.
First Half of Expenditures Made Much Earlier in Early Vote 
States
In the first test considering the relationship between early 
voting and campaign spending, the dependent variable, ‘SD’, is the 
number of days from the election at which a candidate has spent 
50 percent of his or her overall campaign operating expenditures. 
For most candidates, this point comes early in the campaign. The 
intercept places it about two months out from the election. Three 
of the variables, ‘E’, ‘I’, and ‘SP’, all return significant results with p 
values less than .001, .05, and .001, respectively. The strong impact 
of early voting here—candidates in early voting states hit this point 
nearly twenty-four days earlier than candidates in non-early vot-
ing states—is of particular importance to this study, and shows a 
strong correlation with early voting and expenditure timing. The 
other two significant variables here, incumbency and spending pro-
portion, are not surprising. 
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Incumbents have likely been in the race for much longer than their 
challengers, and candidates with an advantage in fundraising are 
likely to spend money to gain that advantage. Overall, this model 
has a relatively weak predictive value, an issue we will address at the 
end of this chapter. 
Early Vote Candidates Also Reach Three Quarters Mark Faster
In the second test, the dependent variable, ‘SD’, was 
moved forward and calculated as the number of days from 
the election at which a candidate had spent 75 percent of his 
or her overall operating expenses for the campaign. The in-
tercept here suggests that, holding other variables constant, 
this occurs for most candidates just under a month away from 
the campaign, or about twenty-three days from the election. 
At this point, most of the big expenditures—TV ad buys, 
polling, and mailings—have been paid for. The relative impact of 
early voting on a candidate when he or she reaches this mark actu-
ally appears to increase. Candidates in early voting states reach this 
mark about sixteen days before candidates in states without early 
voting, compared to the twenty-three days out estimated overall. 
This is proportionally larger than the twenty-four days out of sixty 
overall seen in the 50 percent test. This model also shows less im-
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pact from other variables. Only the spending advantage variable 
is significant, and challengers appear to have caught up with the 
spending of incumbents by this time.
Early Vote Relationship Remains Strong to End of Campaign
In the final test, the dependent variable, ‘SD,’ is calculated 
as the days from Election Day at which the observed candidate 
has spent 90 percent of his or her operating expenses. For most 
campaigns, this point is reached right before, or sometimes after, 
Election Day. As the model shows, the intercept here is just under 
eleven days from Election Day. As was the case with the other two 
models, the presence of early voting is a significant factor in deter-
mining when candidates reach this point in their spending, with 
p< .001. Candidates in states with early voting spent 90 percent 
of their funds more than a week earlier than those in states with-
out early voting. Interestingly, as candidates reach the end of their 
available funds, the significance of overall spending advantage seen 
in the previous two models falls away. Additionally, incumbents, 
who spent the first half of their funds much faster than challengers, 
slowed down their spending significantly and actually reached this 
point about six days after challengers.
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Strong Relationship Does Not Extend to Other Measures of 
Early Voting
The final important finding from these models is the 
lack of importance of variables measuring either the num-
ber of days from the election at which early voting begins or 
the percentage of the electorate voting early. When added to 
the model, neither of these variables has a significant impact 
on either the dependent variable or the model as a whole. 
This suggests that merely the possibility of voters going to 
the polls before Election Day forces campaigns to consider 
moving their spending earlier, even in places where this vot-
ing does not occur particularly early or in particularly large 
numbers.
Model Does Have Significant Limitations
Finally, it is important to consider the significant limita-
tions of these models. All three iterations of the model had 
relatively low predictive value, explaining about 13, 7, and 5 
percent of the variability in the dependent variable, respec-
tively. There is clearly something this model does not, or sim-
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ply cannot, consider. There could be an unknown variable 
causing this effect, but it could also be the result of relatively 
complex and immeasurable randomness. The large number 
of different people, circumstances, and situations surround-
ing each campaign could cause this randomness. There is an 
immeasurable number of variables that could cause variance 
in the timing of expenditures that have yet to be examined 
by campaign scholars. These vary from the speed at which 
candidates raise money, to the personal payment prefer-
ences of individual campaign consultants, to the timing of 
important campaign events or debates. In either case, our 
results hold true. The presence of early voting has a clear im-
pact on the timing of expenditures that would be extremely 
different to confound with another lurking variable, and no 
other variable we tested has clear significance.
Despite Widespread Early Spending in Early Vote States, No 
Evidence to Suggest Electoral Advantage
Despite data showing that campaigns do spend money 
earlier in states with early voting, in the six tests conducted 
here, there is no evidence to suggest that spending money 
early in conjunction with early voting actually improves can-
didate performance. This could be caused by early voters 
who are not persuadable, or it could be that we lack suffi-
cient data or a sufficiently thorough model. There is certainly 
a case to be made that early spending is so widespread that 
there are only a handful of cases in 2008 where one candi-
date spent early while the other did not. Further research 
exploring early voting—possibly focusing on races where 
one candidate spent early and the other did not—could help 
verify this result. At face value, however, these results call into 
question the decision of so many candidates to spend in ad-
vance of early voting periods. The results also offer some cir-
cumstantial evidence to support arguments that candidate 
spending has little to no impact on elections overall. Due 
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to the model’s construction, we cannot rule out that, on the 
whole, campaign spending is insignificant to outcomes, but 
we can conclude that early spending is. 
The second set of models explored the electoral impact 
of early voting and early spending. Model (2) compared chal-
lenger vote share to campaign expenditure timing and the 
timing of early voting in a given state. The third model also 
compared challenger vote share to campaign expenditure 
timing, but replaced the timing of early voting with the vol-
ume of registrants voting early as a percentage of total vot-
ers. Expenditure timing was calculated as the number of days 
between when the observed challenger had spent a certain 
percentage of their expenditures and when the observed 
incumbent had spent that same amount. Each model was 
tested three times with this percentage calculated to 50, 75, 
and 90 percent of total expenditures. Both of these models 
used expenditure and party strength variables from Jacob-
sen’s 1978 study as controls. 
Number of Days to Vote Early and Early Expenditures Show 
No Electoral Advantage
Model (2) CV~CE + SD + SDED + ED + IE + P + PS was run 
three times with the main explanatory variables ‘SD’ (Spend-
ing Days) calculated as the number of days between when a 
challenger as well as the incumbent spent 50, 75, and 90 per-
cent of their respective funds. The variable ‘SDED’ was also 
calculated three times as ‘SD’ multiplied by the number of 
days before Election Day at which general population early 
or absentee voting begins (zero for states without early vot-
ing). 
In all three tests, the primary test variable “Spending Day 
Times Early Day”, failed to show any significance, as did the 
“Spending Day” variable. The control variables taken from Jacob-
sen’s model all consistently showed significant findings, as expected 
given previous research using these variables. Interestingly, the ‘ED’ 
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variable, for which there is not previous research, showed a 
significant negative impact on challenger vote share, suggesting 
that early voting in particular may actually hinder a challenger’s 
ability to win. This is not particularly surprising; it takes time 
for a candidate to gain standing and name recognition as well as 
raise and spend money. A challenger who has less time as a result 
of an early voting date is, in fact, put at a disadvantage against an 
incumbent who likely had a head start.  
Early Expenditures and Early Voting Volume Show No Impact
Model (3) CV~CE + SD + SDEV + EV + IE + P + PS, 
was also run three times, according to the same methodology as 
Model (2). In this model, the variable ‘SDEV’ was calculated as 
‘SD’ multiplied by the percentage of the electorate that voted be-
fore Election Day (zero for states without early voting). 
Again, in all three tests, the primary test variable ‘SDEV’ 
failed to show any significance, as did the ‘SD’ variable, while the 
control variables taken from Jacobsen’s model again consistently 
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showed significant findings. Unlike the lone ‘ED’ variable from the 
previous model, the lone ‘EV’ variable did not have a significant 
negative impact on challenger vote share. This suggests that vot-
ing done particularly early may disadvantage challengers who may 
not have time to raise money, run ads, or make themselves known. 
Simply having a large portion of the population voting early does 
not have that same effect. In fact, one might hypothesize that larger 
populations voting early could actually mitigate the effects of the 
‘ED’ variable by forcing challengers to start their campaigns early, 
but that’s a question for another study
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CONCLUSION
This study begins to fill a significant gap in the literature 
left by the exclusion of early voting from research on cam-
paign expenditures and the study of campaigns at large. By 
no means should this be seen as an exhaustive attempt to 
do so. The study is limited, looking only at a single election 
cycle and only at U.S. House races, but it is an important first 
step. Early voting plays a major role in modern campaigns on 
the federal, state, and local levels, but the process has been 
segregated in the literature into its own sub-field. An adjust-
ment must be made across the field to incorporate early vot-
ing into dozens of studies in every aspect of research into 
campaigns. 
Rather than a comprehensive correction of this prob-
lem, this study should be seen as an attempt to expose the 
gap and challenge the field to fill it. The study demonstrates 
the significance of early voting in U.S. elections and the need 
to incorporate it into all lines of study. Specifically, in the find-
ings of the first model, we see the real impact early voting 
has on the conduct of campaigns. Campaigns in early vot-
ing states are spending their money weeks ahead of those 
in states without early voting—something every avenue of 
research into campaigns needs to consider. This is almost 
certainly not a phenomenon reserved to U.S. House races 
and needs to be studied across the political landscape. What 
is more, the use of a staggered voting procedure provides 
a wealth of variables scholars can use to better understand 
voting behavior itself. The literature needs to incorporate 
this shift in voting patterns into every aspect of campaign 
research.
This study also holds real world applications, encourag-
ing candidates and campaign strategists to reconsider their 
previous answers to the difficult question of when to spend 
money during a campaign. The findings call into question 
the decision of so many campaigns to sink valuable cam-
136 Zakahi  •  Early Voting in American Elections
paign funds into ad buys and “get out the vote” programs 
well in advance of Election Day that which are aimed solely at 
targeting and turning out early voters. Further research into 
this question is necessary to conclude decisively that early 
spending is a waste of money, but the findings of Models (2) 
and (3) suggest that the spending is ineffective. At the least, 
they raise the distinct possibility that spending money in ad-
vance of early voting—often seen as a common sense prac-
tice—is actually not. 
Finally, the findings of these models question the im-
pact of campaign spending at all. This study demonstrates 
the potential for early voting to be used as a tool for delving 
more deeply into the relationship between campaign spend-
ing and candidate success. Using a proportional measure of 
campaign expenditures, we are able to control for lurking 
variables previously unaccounted for in studies of a large size 
and rigor. The technique used in this study can help to shine 
light on the hotly debated question of whether or not incum-
bent expenditures change outcomes and offer a method for 
analyzing campaign expenditure effects in the future. 
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